machine_dove (![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png)
machine_dove) wrote2004-06-15 12:36 pm
machine_dove) wrote2004-06-15 12:36 pm
Second Verse, Same as the First
Must...resist...tinfoil...
Once again we have a situation where Those Who Would Know are saying these things are a really, really, really bad idea, and are being ignored by those in power (either political or economic).
To repeat a few key points, a voter-verifiable paper trail is not a receipt the voter can take with them. Receipts are a baaaaaad idea. Very bad. Like "You know, we're going to be downsizing soon...oh by the way, show me who you voted for" bad. We don't want to go there. A paper trail simply means that there are actual, countable, unchangable paper representations of the votes made on each machine, so that if the results are ever called into question there can be a recount.
Also, while we're on the subject, internet voting is also a horridly bad idea. Like "My friend Vinnie here is going to help you vote while I look after your sick father" kind of bad. But I digress.
I've heard the outcry from computer security professionals likened to the public outcry when mechanical voting machines were first announced, but there's a huge difference that these comparisons miss. Namely, the outcry over mechanical voting machines came from people who didn't understand how they worked. The outcry over electronic voting machines is coming from professionals in the computer security field, the sort of person who's going to understand better than anyone else exactly how these things work and exactly how many ways things can go south with them.
Minor technical hiccups, indeed. Many of these voting machines are being "secured" with tamper-proof tape. If the tamper-proof tape has been, ahem, tampered with, then the machine is pulled. Great, but nobody ever seems to mention all the voters who have just been disenfranchised as a direct result.
Some people just miss the point entirely, either by oversight or design. Here's an example from the article (emphasis mine):
State officials say there is no need for recounts, or an audit trail, with the touchscreen system because it was designed to prevent people from voting in the same race more than once — an overvote — and provide multiple alerts to voters to warn them when they are skipping a race — an undervote.
Great, but what do we do if the results are challenged? How do we know if the electronic data has been tampered with? Even better, how can we prove the data wasn't tampered with? Short answer - we don't, can't, and never will.
It can be argues that the point of an election isn't really to decide who wins, it's to prove to the loser that he lacks sufficient support to take control in a less peaceful manner.
What happens to our country when we can no longer trust our elections? A few suffed ballot-boxes here and there don't usually change the course of an election, but a few flipped bits here and there certainly could.
I could go on for much, much longer about the other flaws and perils associated with electronic voting, but I think I've done enough damage for one day.
[EDIT] Nevermind, you didn't really think I could stay away now, did you? Especially not when people are so damned determined to repeat mistakes. Two cursory checks of the new list have already turned up major inaccuracies. A new list drawn up by a group under the direct control of Jeb. I think I'm going to go through my limited stock of outrage rather quickly if things like this continue through November.
Once again we have a situation where Those Who Would Know are saying these things are a really, really, really bad idea, and are being ignored by those in power (either political or economic).
To repeat a few key points, a voter-verifiable paper trail is not a receipt the voter can take with them. Receipts are a baaaaaad idea. Very bad. Like "You know, we're going to be downsizing soon...oh by the way, show me who you voted for" bad. We don't want to go there. A paper trail simply means that there are actual, countable, unchangable paper representations of the votes made on each machine, so that if the results are ever called into question there can be a recount.
Also, while we're on the subject, internet voting is also a horridly bad idea. Like "My friend Vinnie here is going to help you vote while I look after your sick father" kind of bad. But I digress.
I've heard the outcry from computer security professionals likened to the public outcry when mechanical voting machines were first announced, but there's a huge difference that these comparisons miss. Namely, the outcry over mechanical voting machines came from people who didn't understand how they worked. The outcry over electronic voting machines is coming from professionals in the computer security field, the sort of person who's going to understand better than anyone else exactly how these things work and exactly how many ways things can go south with them.
Minor technical hiccups, indeed. Many of these voting machines are being "secured" with tamper-proof tape. If the tamper-proof tape has been, ahem, tampered with, then the machine is pulled. Great, but nobody ever seems to mention all the voters who have just been disenfranchised as a direct result.
Some people just miss the point entirely, either by oversight or design. Here's an example from the article (emphasis mine):
State officials say there is no need for recounts, or an audit trail, with the touchscreen system because it was designed to prevent people from voting in the same race more than once — an overvote — and provide multiple alerts to voters to warn them when they are skipping a race — an undervote.
Great, but what do we do if the results are challenged? How do we know if the electronic data has been tampered with? Even better, how can we prove the data wasn't tampered with? Short answer - we don't, can't, and never will.
It can be argues that the point of an election isn't really to decide who wins, it's to prove to the loser that he lacks sufficient support to take control in a less peaceful manner.
What happens to our country when we can no longer trust our elections? A few suffed ballot-boxes here and there don't usually change the course of an election, but a few flipped bits here and there certainly could.
I could go on for much, much longer about the other flaws and perils associated with electronic voting, but I think I've done enough damage for one day.
[EDIT] Nevermind, you didn't really think I could stay away now, did you? Especially not when people are so damned determined to repeat mistakes. Two cursory checks of the new list have already turned up major inaccuracies. A new list drawn up by a group under the direct control of Jeb. I think I'm going to go through my limited stock of outrage rather quickly if things like this continue through November.
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There's also the issue of what you do when someone votes incorrectly and wants to change it - with paper ballots you give that back, it gets destroyed, and a new one is handed to you.
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-- Ronald Reagan
The failings of internet voting are pretty clear. Any time you take a "black box" mentality, it encourages those of no morality to push the bounds of acceptable behaviour. Let's say the Whig party owned a district, and they wanted to give a little more "oomph" to the Whig candidate. Who would monitor the election? Primarily Whigs, so as to overpower the Bull Moose party's handlers. Who would inspect the machines? Whigs.
"It's not who votes that counts, but who counts the votes."
-- Joseph Stalin